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a  b  s t  r a  c t
Beginning  with  the  ethical case  for  maximising  the  impact of  health care  resources on health,  this  article
examines  nine  arguments  for  exempting  cancer  treatments from  rigorous  economic  evaluation or  for
relaxing  some of the  conditions often  required if  an  intervention  is to be  provided at public expense.
Some  of these  may  have  validity  under particular circumstances  but,  in general,  if  these  arguments  apply
at all  they  apply also to other  treatments for similarly placed  patients (for example, those  near  the  end
of their  lives)  and so  do not constitute an argument  for  treating  cancer patients as  such  more  favourably
than  others. The arguments  need to be  more  than  merely  valid. They  need  also  to have  quantitative and
qualitative  signiﬁcance.
© 2016 Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.
1. Prioritising
1.1. How ought priorities for public health care spending to  be
set?
Context always matters, so let us set a  context. I shall assume we
are thinking about the value of health care interventions – speciﬁ-
cally, ones for the beneﬁt of cancer patients, actual or  potential (as
in preventive interventions) – in a  publicly ﬁnanced health care sys-
tem. The ultimate payers are therefore taxpayers and the ultimate
beneﬁciaries are cancer patients within that jurisdiction, whether
or not they are taxpayers. The ethical issues that arise differ some-
what under conditions of private health insurance ﬁnancing, but
that is not our concern here. The broad questions of prioritisa-
tion, chief of which concerns the selection of interventions to be
provided publicly and the terms of access to them, are therefore
necessarily to be collectively determined and the values embodied
in such decisions are, in the same sense social values, being made on
behalf of a community by  publicly accountable “decision makers”.
Let us take it as given that no one is  in  denial that priorities
have to be established. This may  be done implicitly or explicitly, in
camera or under the public’s gaze. The second is  always preferable
unless it damages the integrity of the process.1 Let us also take it
E-mail address: tony.culyer@york.ac.uk
1 As when the matter is  personal and private, or price-sensitive but public.
as given that in  any period the resources normally2 available in a
national health insurance system are set by some planning process
at a  high (say, cabinet) level of government, along with other broad
decisions regarding expenditure on education, defence, the envi-
ronment and so on. We shall consider the question at a slightly less
high level – that is, at the level of decisions at the top level of a
ministry of health – where the decisions are about the allocation
of the “budget” as determined by the higher process.3 Speciﬁcally,
some of the decisions are about the health care procedures and
interventions to be provided. It  is  these decisions on which we
focus. In  practice, some decisions may  be delegated to a  lower or
arm’s length agency that either sets the priorities or makes rec-
ommendations about them. Finally, let us assume that  the main
purpose of public health insurance is to enhance the health of the
population4 without causing anyone to  bankrupt themselves, or
even to  suffer signiﬁcant ﬁnancial hardship. Other objectives com-
monly include reassurance (e.g.  “you’re OK”), information provision
(e.g. diagnostic utility), certiﬁcation (e.g. for legitimate absence
from work), reduction in  uncertainty (e.g. about one’s exposure to
health risks), social solidarity (“this is our health service”), social
or national iconography (e.g. “our system represents the ‘kind of
2 That is, excluding those set aside for public emergencies.
3 The  private sector analogy is  a  third party insurer designing a beneﬁts package
and  anticipating a stream of premium income and co-payments to  cover its cost.
4 This is commonly treated as allocating resources according to need. For why
such  an approach is not a  good idea see [1,2].
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcpo.2016.09.007
2213-5383/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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people we are”’), support for manufacturing and innovation (e.g.
in supply chain industries), and sometimes even the provision of
ineffective but popularly demanded treatments (e.g. by traditional
healers, alternative medicine, religion-driven interventions). Each
of these objectives makes a claim on the overall budget. Evidently
not all of them directly enhance population health and neither do
they all have equal merit. That is  not to say that the domination
of the impact on health is  either automatic or overwhelming, only
that it takes a powerful moral argument if a sacriﬁce of population
health is to be made for any other objective. The reality therefore is
that all these activities have a  speciﬁc opportunity cost. If the health
budget is spent in part on, say, ineffective traditional medicine, it is
necessarily spent at the expense of something else. In  considering
that part of the budget that is for health itself, the opportunity cost
(as economists say) is not any old something else, it is – and only can
be –  health. Thus adding a  new clinical procedure, given the bud-
get limit, necessitates disinvesting in another. Assuming that other
procedure also to have been an effective procedure, the opportunity
cost of the new procedure is  the consequential loss of health which
the old procedure would have generated. If the old procedure was
not effective, it had no business being in the beneﬁts package in the
ﬁrst place.
The father of evidence-based medicine, Archie Cochrane, wrote
in 1972, “All effective treatment must be free” [3,p. 1]. This does not
mean that effective treatments do not  use resources – resources
that have other good uses, for the treatments in question are  not
what economists call “free goods”5; even if Cochrane’s slogan cer-
tainly does mean that people should not be exposed to  the burden
of paying for them individually. That burden is a collective one,
requiring fairness in  the distribution of the ﬁnancial burden and
equity and efﬁciency in the choices made about the services to be
available. Some of these choices are tough. Many concern cancer.
So, how should they be made?
2. Prioritising health care spending –  the general case
In order to prioritise one needs to be able to compare. We need
some acceptable common measure or indicator of the contribution
that each intervention makes to health. It must be common, like
change in mortality or life-years gained, or SF-36 (36 item short
form survey), or QALYs (Quality-Adjusted Life-Years) or averted
burden of disease like DALYs (Disability-Adjusted Life-Years), in
order for decision makers to  be able to make comparisons of the
productivity of each across what may  be very different sorts of
intervention (surgical and medical, many disease categories, chains
of supply, imported or home-produced, etc.). Some interventions
are disease speciﬁc, like the cancer treatments; some are not dis-
ease speciﬁc, like interventions to  improve childhood nutrition;
others may  be preventive; yet others diagnostic; while others, like
community clinics or hospitals, are examples of general delivery
platforms or common generic resources available for delivering
treatments for many diseases and interventions. A common out-
come measure is needed for them all.
If decision makers cannot make reasonable comparisons they
can hardly make reasonable choices. This may  seem a  self-evident
point. However, nearly all (or at any rate a very large number of)
the studies of the effectiveness of interventions for health have
measures of outcome (e.g. biological, physiological, symptomatic,
physical functioning, mental functioning) that ensure comparisons
cannot be made other than amongst a  restricted set of options.
Selecting an appropriate outcome measure is no minor task and will
5 “‘Free good’ is used in economics to  describe a good that is  not scarce; more of
which is not demanded than is  already available at a  zero price: as much is  available
as  anyone wants.” [4]
Fig. 1. Health care  interventions arranged like books on  a  shelf.
be contingent on contextual factors like the quality of the available
database, the precision required for policy decisions and ethnic and
other traditions, for example as to what is  understood by “health”.
What is  appropriate in Canada may  not be appropriate (or even fea-
sible) in Malawi. I  shall assume, however, that these major matters
have been settled.
It is  helpful to analyse the main issues by use of a  model. A model
is  a  simpliﬁcation of reality which, if it is  to be useful, removes
all inessentials (i.e. elements that are irrelevant for immediate
purposes) enabling one to focus on key issues and relationships.
Consider a bookshelf analogy [5] as such a  model. Imagine a  book-
shelf like that in Fig. 1 – a  very long bookshelf – of health care
interventions, each like a  book, and ranked according to its effec-
tiveness per $1,000 (its height), with the most effective on the left
and the less effective stretching away on the right. The effectiveness
is the discounted expected net improvement in  health over the full
period for which it endures.6 The fatness of each book represents
the estimated (discounted) cost of providing it. This is a  combina-
tion of the costs of a  speciﬁc technology, like a  drug, the costs of
associated procedures (other medicines, diagnostic services, com-
munity services, etc.) for as long as the treatment continues, and the
estimated number of people using the intervention in question. The
area of each book’s spine is  evidently a  measure of the total health
generated by use of that intervention. The maximum possible total
health generated by any given rate of expenditure is the entire area
under the roofscape of the books up to  the given expenditure.
Consider now Fig. 2.  A population health promoter will select
the ﬁrst book on the left and add books (that is, further interven-
tions) moving along the shelf until she exhausts the budget. At  that
point (B) all the interventions selected will be effective and only the
most effective of those that are effective will have been selected.
The only services offered under public health insurance are  those to
the left. The least cost-effective intervention that is included indi-
cates a  “threshold” of to,  a  measure the effectiveness-cost ratio of
the least effective procedure included in the insured bundle. Any
new candidate for inclusion in the insured bundle must be at least
as cost-effective as this. At the budget limit, and with only cost-
effective interventions being used, the total health generated is  area
under the roofscape of the books up to  the budget limit.
The reason why the interventions on the right are not  included is
not  because they are ineffective. On the contrary, they are all effec-
tive. One would have to  go a  long way to the right before hitting zero
productivity or slipping into the zone of iatrogenesis. The trouble
6 A simpliﬁcation in this model is  that each intervention (book on  the shelf) has a
constant cost and a constant productivity in terms of health. In practice one might
expect the marginal cost of rolling out an intervention to rise (as for example, one
reaches out to  patients groups that are harder to  reach) and its  marginal beneﬁts
to  fall (if one prioritizes those most capable of beneﬁting ﬁrst). Those assumptions
would  be inappropriate in a model for analysing the ideal speed and extent of roll-
outs but do  not affect any of the conclusions reached here.
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Fig. 2. The threshold that divides included interventions from excluded interven-
tions.
Fig. 3. Health loss from poor technology selection.
with them is that they are  not effective enough. The benchmark test
for inclusion of further interventions is the cost-effectiveness of the
least cost-effective intervention that is included in the plan, to,  if
they fail this test they are not  cost-effective.7 It immediately follows
that merely to  demonstrate the effectiveness of an intervention is
not enough to ensure its inclusion in  the insured bundle. Advo-
cates for speciﬁc interventions or types of patient need therefore to
demonstrate relative effectiveness. One way of doing this is to make
direct comparisons between interventions, for example a  cancer
versus a non-cancer treatment. A less cumbersome procedure is
to use the threshold, and make comparisons with that.8 The cost-
effectiveness of an intervention cannot be evaluated independently
of a threshold.
The morality of proper use of a threshold comes from its impact
on people’s health, which may  be taken as having a  moral worth
that usually trumps that  of non-health objectives of health care
systems. If interventions on the right of the threshold are allowed
to replace any on its left, population health falls. In  Fig.  3 books on
the shelf have been swapped from either side  of the budget line.
The cross-hatched area is the loss of life and/or quality of life from
having the wrong things in the plan.9 Decision makers are typically
ignorant as to whether they have the right things assigned to either
side of the vertical budget line but so  long as they always replace
interventions having lower productivity per dollar with ones that
7 What is to be judged cost-effective is  thus context-dependent − it depends on
the  budget as well as other things.
8 We abstract, as previously stated, from the effectiveness of interventions of all
kinds on the non-health objectives of health care  systems and their budgets.
9 In practice, the area indicated in Fig. 3 is likely to overstate the health loss. See
[5].
have higher productivity per dollar, they will be moving in the right
direction and, if they also ensure that those that are  included have
a productivity per dollar that is higher than the effectiveness-cost
ratio to, then they can be  conﬁdent of extracting even more health
from their health dollars.
There is the converse: if the low productivity intervention is
already in the bundle, then the cross-hatched area  represents the
health gain from eliminating it and replacing it with the more pro-
ductive technology on the right. Note the politically difﬁcult and
somewhat counterintuitive fact: disinvestment, even in effective
technologies, can increase health provided there is  complementary
investment of the right kind.
3. Cancer care: costliness and effectiveness
Many oncological treatments have received approval for inclu-
sion of public health insurance plans in recent years and some
have not. Both the reasonableness of their prices and the
value of their impact on the health of patients are contro-
versial. The launch prices of new cancer drugs, which include
uplifts on direct production and distribution costs for “over-
head” R&D costs, have increased over time in real terms [6].  Bae
and Mullins [7] note an estimated average annual cost of end-
stage breast cancer treatment of $94,000. The same authors also
report widely differing thresholds across US institutions and third
party payers, from incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs)
of $6000–$745,000 per Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY). The
mean was  $139,000 and the median $56,000. For non-cancer
treatments the range was  $54,000–$332,000 with a  mean of
$50,000 and a  median of $31,000 per QALY. They compared
these ICERs with threshold norms for what counts as “cost-
effective” of $50,000–$100,000. The implications are  evident:
cancer treatments in general are substantially less cost-effective
than non-cancer treatments, they are substantially more costly,
they vary greatly, and many exceed the conventional range of  cost-
effectiveness.
Variation in  the willingness of an agency (or a  country) to
pay, as reﬂected in a  threshold value or range is, of course, to  be
expected, not least because willingness to  pay is  normally higher
when per capita incomes are higher and more generous beneﬁts
can be purchased. In the National Health Service (NHS) in Eng-
land and Wales, the conventional range of £20,000–£50,000 has
often been exceeded by cancer drugs, and some have been denied
to NHS patients as a  result. Public controversies arising from such
decisions were met  (in part) by the creation of a  special Can-
cer Drugs Fund in  2011, even though the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) already allowed a  higher cost-
per-QALY threshold for end-of-life drugs. There was in effect a
dual threshold: one for cancer treatments and one for all the rest.
Maynard and Bloor delivered a  harsh criticism: “The Cancer Drugs
Fund not only undermines NICE decision making and weakens
incentives for companies to  price their products at a  level that is
affordable and justiﬁed by health improvements, but also singles
out a  particular disease for favourable treatment in an essentially
arbitrary manner. The emotive power of this disease led  politi-
cians to capture support by singling it out for preference” [8,p.
137].10
It is  to be expected that the regulated seek to “capture” the reg-
ulator [9,10]. One way  in which this can be achieved is  through
exploiting the softer elements in a  regulatory process. For exam-
ple, most agencies charged with identifying cost-effective clinical
10 In countries, like South Africa, which have dual systems of health care, there
will  be (implicitly) dual thresholds and an important strategic issue becomes the
harmonisation of standards (and therefore thresholds) over time
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interventions address the many uncertainties that  can attach to
process design, scientiﬁc evidence and the value content of deci-
sion rules through the use of consultative and deliberative methods.
These open up many opportunities for special interests to bias
decisions [11] as well as for the agencies to protect themselves
against such biases. The harder elements too may  come under
sustained pressure. In the UK, NICE’s cost-effectiveness threshold
has met  with sustained arguments from industry for its raising.
The Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry’s Paul Catch-
pole maintained that the threshold that NICE applies is too low
and out of step with what the general public perceive is  appro-
priate to pay for life extending cancer medicines: “a  sustainable
solution must now be  found which empowers NICE to  approve
more new cancer medicines using different criteria and different
values that reﬂect in practice more closely those that are  used by
today’s NHS to make investment decisions” (reported in  [12]). The
objective of industry might well – and not unreasonably – be to
have more cancer medicines approved, but the objective of the
health care system is more usually to put them to a  fair test of cost-
effectiveness. A manufacturers’ strategy that accepted this would
place its emphasis on increasing the overall health care budget,
thereby indirectly lowering to and raising the cost-effectiveness
threshold.11
NICE had from its early days been explicit about the value judg-
ments that were embodied in its decisions [13]. It created the
Citizens Council in part to ensure that social value judgments had
a full discussion and consideration. The justiﬁcation for the Can-
cer  Drug Fund was in part that NICE received a report from its
Citizens Council recommending the use of ﬁfteen further crite-
ria in addition to cost-effectiveness [14].  The argument adduced
by the Department of Health in 2010 was on grounds of the
“possibility” that society values beneﬁts to patients with cancer
more highly than beneﬁts to other kinds of patient [15].  There
is, however, little evidence for this possibility actually being the
case [16,17]. Further, the Committee of Public Accounts of the
British parliament complained that the government “do not have
the data needed to assess the impact of the Fund on patient
outcomes, such as extending patients’ lives, or to demonstrate
whether this is a good use of taxpayers’ money” [18,p. 3]. The Fund
was an under-researched political reaction to  the fact that NICE
judged NHS resources to  be better spent on treatments for non-
cancer patients. The government overrode a careful and respected
decision-making process with an ad hoc  one that led to  uncon-
trolled expenditures, reintroduced “post-code prescribing” into the
NHS [19,18] and substituted cost-ineffective care for cost-effective
care.
4. Can cancer be exempted from the criteria?
The moral question inevitably arises: what justiﬁcations might
be offered for including cost-ineffective interventions like that rep-
resented by the cross-hatched rectangle in Fig. 3, well below the
effectiveness-cost threshold? The effectiveness-cost ratio is the
reciprocal of the more familiar cost-effectiveness ratio. The same
question might therefore be put thus: what justiﬁcations might
be offered for including cost-ineffective interventions like that
represented by the cross-hatched rectangle, well above the cost-
effectiveness threshold?
11 Their argument would still be biased unless they found some way  of demon-
strating that a smaller budget for education, transport and other publicly ﬁnanced
services, or for taxpayers’ private consumption, was justiﬁable.
4.1. Argument 1: the whole health maximisation assumption
underlying the approach is misconceived. health care is about
more than just promoting health. other objectives commonly
include financial protection (e.g. from the out-of-pocket expense
of costly interventions), innovation, and all those listed earlier
However, these alternative reasons for having public health
insurance afford no special status for cancer. For example, insur-
ance provides protection for all health care expenses covered under
a  public plan including many other costly procedures. The mere
fact that cancer treatments are often very costly (in terms of  the
health necessarily forgone) is no argument unless they can deliver
an expected health gain that counts for more. And the fact that they
deliver some health gain  (i.e. are effective) is, as we  have seen, not
a  sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for their inclusion.
4.2. Argument 2: innovation is stifled by the strict application a
cost-effectiveness threshold that is too low
Innovation is desired across all disease areas, provided it is inno-
vation that  leads to real and substantial health beneﬁts that are
realizable at affordable cost. Innovation is already rewarded (or
at least encouraged) through the patent system and with special
pricing and proﬁt regulatory schemes in  most countries. To win on
an innovation argument a  case has to be  made that cancer R&D is
inherently more innovative than other clinical R&D and that this
renders it worth the additional sacriﬁce of other people’s health
and lives. The innovation argument is frequently adduced by phar-
maceutical manufacturers and may  be one reason why  the UK
government introduced its special Cancer Drugs Fund in 2011. This
decision missed two wonderful opportunities: ﬁrst to explain to
manufacturers and to the public that  the kind of innovation wanted
was not for the invention of extremely expensive interventions of
small beneﬁt, rather for inventions of the opposite kind; second to
make clear to everyone the opportunity cost argument that  lies at
the core of the case for agencies such as NICE and CADTH (the Cana-
dian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in  Health), namely that you
can spend health care resources only once and a million dollars
spent on a  particular technology should never be at the expense of
a higher, or more certain, health gain that could have been obtained
through an alternative use of those dollars – never, that is, without
a careful marshalling of good reasons for sacriﬁcing the health of
some for the beneﬁt of others. Achieving public understanding of
both kinds would have been marks of true leadership.
4.3. Argument 3: the use of standard outcome measures, like the
EQ-5D QALY or averted DALYs, underestimates the health benefits
of cancer treatments
It is  possible that these measures omit some aspects of beneﬁt
to  patients that  are not captured in  the QALY/DALY algorithms, but
it is far from clear whether this confers an unfair disadvantage in
cancer relative to other diseases and, if it does, precisely what the
omitted element is  and how signiﬁcant it is  judged to  be. One of the
important reasons for having patients and informal carers involved,
as in England and Wales, in the decisions about inclusion or exclu-
sion from beneﬁt packages is  precisely to check that  the outcome
measure matches the kinds of concerns of those most intimately
involved (that is, patients and their informal carers). If  there are
omissions in particular cases, this participation allows them to be
spotted and may  make a  case for giving such cancer treatments
lower hurdles – but the case needs to be made convincingly and
preferably in a quantiﬁed or  well-researched qualitative way.
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4.4. Argument 4:  the assessment of benefit excludes the beneficial
effects that treatment and its consequences have on those who
care for cancer patients
If these effects are indeed neglected, are genuine beneﬁts and
there are no additional actual burdens, and if they are substantial,
then this argument would carry weight. Again their qualitative and
quantitative signiﬁcance needs to be  convincingly demonstrated
and not merely asserted. In England and Wales, NICE routinely con-
siders any such effects that are judged to be of signiﬁcance and
requires their quantiﬁcation. Of course, not all regulatory agencies
may  be as thorough as this.
4.5. Argument 5: the opportunity cost argument is weak. there
are always efficiency savings that  can be found in any system
which mean that the alleged sacrifice of health represented by  the
threshold is spurious. the actual sacrifice is much smaller
It is true that no system will be perfectly efﬁcient but it does not
follow that health opportunities are not  forgone when resources
are devoted to particular interventions. The answer to  an empir-
ical question must be empirical enquiry. What does the evidence
say about the actual sacriﬁces? Such evidence as we have [20] sug-
gests strongly that  the conventional thresholds used (for example
in the UK) are already too high, so raising them still further would
increase the loss of health elsewhere in  the system by introducing
cost-ineffective treatments. More to the point, however, there is  no
reason to suppose that the health losses imposed elsewhere in  the
system by any given expenditure on cancer care are either larger or
smaller than the same sum spent on any other treatment or com-
bination of treatments. The efﬁciency savings argument cannot be
one for cancer as a special case. If there is a  case, it is that the oppor-
tunity cost argument overstates the health cost of all treatments.
4.6. Argument 6: cancer is a scary disease and people who suffer
from it deserve to have  access to treatments that would fail a
conventional cost-effectiveness test
There is no doubt that most people live in  fear of cancer, but
people also live in fear of many diseases, and the fact that  they
are fearful (as distinct from being able to be  offered remedies that
remove the fear because they are effective either in  preventing the
disease or relieving its consequences) is  not a good reason for deny-
ing cost-effective health care to others, be they fearful or unfearful.
If  there are effective ways of relieving fear, they may  be justiﬁably
included but not if the only source of relief comes from a  modest
reduction in symptoms not  justiﬁed by  its cost and possibly better
achieved through alternatives, like palliation.
Childhood cancer may  be  viewed as demanding special sympa-
thy but, if so, the same relaxation of the strict criteria of evaluation
should apply on grounds of horizontal justice to similarly placed
children suffering from other diseases.
4.7. Argument 7: for some cancer patients a costly and not very
effective treatment may  offer a “last chance” to someone in
despair. such a situation might exist if no intervention of any kind
existed for these patients or if  the patient suffered from a rare
form of cancer
Whether there truly is no alternative treatment is  a matter of
fact which needs to  be established. If the proposed treatment is
simply ineffective, then the last chance is  illusory and such patients
needs to be counselled accordingly; if it is  cost-ineffective, then the
judgment has to  relate ﬁrst to the extent to which despair, as a  mat-
ter of fact, is reasonably to  be expected to be relieved and, second,
whether it is worth the sacriﬁce of the health of other people that
giving the treatment would necessarily entail. There may  be a case
here – provided that  the despair is indeed likely to  be relieved. This
is, plainly, a  judgment call that  those responsible for making deci-
sions about the inclusion of treatments in  a  beneﬁts package need
to  consider. It  seems, however, a  ﬂimsy12 ground for sacriﬁcing
health beneﬁts elsewhere.
In  the case of rare cancers, the question arises of the moral status
of rarity per se. Do rare cancer sufferers deserve greater sympathy
than other cancer sufferers and, if so, do  they also deserve greater
sympathy than others with rare non-cancer diseases? If it is not the
rarity per se but the fact, say, that much less is  known about the
effectiveness of treatments in  relatively unresearched rare disease
territory, then a  judgment needs to  be formed as to  the acceptabil-
ity of the risk of delivering ineffective or cost-ineffective care. Such
matters plainly require considerable deliberation but common hor-
izontal justice again requires that similar treatment be accorded to
non-cancer patients with rare or under-researched conditions.
4.8. Argument 8: cancer is a “severe” disease and should
accordingly be given a higher priority than less severe diseases
If this argument is  accepted, it plainly has consequences for the
treatment of all diseases classed as “severe”, again on grounds of
horizontal justice. Severity seems generally to  be conceived as a
serious and progressive condition expected to  lead to  premature
death. It  is related to more general philosophical arguments for
giving priority to those who are “worse off” (classically [21]). There
are several difﬁculties with the severity argument [22] but chief
amongst them is that it is  indifferent to  the effectiveness of the
treatment and completely blind to  its opportunity cost. As a  conse-
quence, ineffective treatments for severe cases would command a
higher priority for funding in  a beneﬁts package than highly effec-
tive interventions for less severe conditions. For the same reason,
providing relatively cost-ineffective treatments would deny care
to  others whose conditions were judged to  be  insufﬁciently severe,
despite the availability of highly effective and relative cheap inter-
ventions.
4.9. Argument 9: many cancer patients have a  short life
expectancy even with treatment. a quasi-utilitarian argument
might cite the law of diminishing marginal value: even small
gains for  such people are to be valued more highly than the same
gains of equivalent quality of life for people with an already long
expectation of life. alternatively, there is the more direct
emotional appeal “Our moral response to the imminence of death
demands that we rescue the doomed” [22]
This “rule of rescue” argument [23,24] makes two intuitive
appeals but has two  important caveats. First, the strength of the
argument is  much weakened if the additional time, short though
it may  be, is in fact of poor quality and even of a  worse qual-
ity than would be the case under normal palliative care. Second,
the end-of-life argument applies to  all with short life expectan-
cies whether or not they are cancer patients. These other patients
also include non-cancer end-of-life patients who could beneﬁt
from cost-ineffective treatments not  currently in  the beneﬁts pack-
age but which, were these patients to receive similar end-of-life
weightings as cancer patients, might be included. Again, assessing
these claims and identifying those potentially affected are empiri-
cal, not rhetorical, questions whose answers are currently not  clear.
Claims concerning them from self-interested sources like manu-
facturers and cancer lobbying groups ought to be  treated with the
12 I do  not wish to  imply that all qualitative arguments are  ﬂimsy, only that this
one  is.
Please cite this article in  press as: A.J. Culyer, Ethics, priorities and cancer, J Cancer Policy (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcpo.2016.09.007
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelJCPO-78; No. of Pages 6
6  A.J. Culyer / Journal of Cancer Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
same scepticism that should attach to all biased vested interest
claims on resources. Such evidence as there is  does not support the
idea that the public in  general supports the end-of-life argument
[16,17].
5. The burden of proof
These arguments fall into two broad groups. Some are questions
of social value: how should we value health gains of particular kinds
and should we value them differently according as they accrue
to different people? Others are questions of fact: would informa-
tion about the quantitative size of the effects in  question lead us
to conclude that cancer is  indeed a  special case? The burden of
proof in both cases lies with those making the assertion that can-
cer is, indeed, special. That burden of proof is  not impossible to
bear. But merely to assert the arguments listed here is not good
enough: until the empirics are done Maynard and Bloor’s [8] charge
of arbitrariness will stand.
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